The end-game of Brexit: achieving victory from the jaws of defeat? by de Ruyter, A.
The end-game of Brexit: achieving 
victory from the jaws of defeat? 
By Professor Alex de Ruyter, Centre for Brexit Studies 
EU negotiations are, it seems, entering the final phase. Within the 
next week we should have a much clearer view on what the final deal 
will consist of. Given that it’s taken some two and a half years to get to 
this stage following the referendum vote in June 2016, there is a good 
chance that the majority of the public are sick and tired of being 
bombarded with a lexicon associated Brexit. It is strongly believed that 
the average person is clueless about what are customs 
arrangements, Canada (or Norway) models, WTO rules and 
‘backstop’ plans to resolve the impasse of the border between 
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. 
Though there is a compelling argument that whatever deal with the 
UK and EU is eventually agreed should be put before the general 
public in a referendum, there is an opposing view that it’s all too 
complicated and, having taken the decision to leave, it is up to 
professional politicians to sort out the detail. In effect, the great 
majority of the British public has become increasingly exasperated at 
a process that was supposed to be straightforward. As Brenda from 
Bristol might exclaim, “Not another referendum?” and, perhaps, “just 
do it!” 
Whatever the eventual outcome of Brexit, there can be few very who 
envisaged the bile and emotion that has accompanied the debate. 
However, there is an increasingly persuasive argument that despite 
what has been said about Theresa May, she has actually played a 
blinder in getting to a point that was obvious from the outset; leaving 
the EU but, for the sake of business, keeping as closely aligned to it 
as possible. The so called ‘BRINO solution’, Brexit in name only. 
The reality is that the public were never ever going to be given a say 
in Brexit. Having taken the decision to conduct a referendum on the 
EU, no politician leader would want to unleash that tiger a second 
time. It’s just too dangerous and likely to make a divided country even 
more so. 
Theresa May has, like previous Tory prime ministers, most particularly 
John Major, discovered that the most dangerous enemies are those 
who come from within the party. The anti-EU brigade within the Tory 
party have spent their entire careers being dedicated to, as they see 
it, wrestling back sovereignty from Brussels. It should not be forgotten 
that David Cameron called the referendum in the naïve belief that the 
outcome would be to remain and, accordingly, could silence those 
who, in 2013, one of his close allies described as “swivel-eyed loons” 
Theresa May has been aware that isolating this group as much as 
possible was essential to creating as benign environment as possible 
for a deal that would be effectively neutral for business. Her mistake, 
and what may result in her being replaced as leader, was to call an 
election in the belief that a bigger party would make it easier to deal 
with the Brexiteers. Hindsight, as we can all attest, is a wonderful 
thing. Nonetheless, though we appear to be at a stage that informed 
commentators suggested from the outset was the most likely 
outcome, there is still the small matter of getting agreed. This will be 
the tough bit. 
Writing in the Irish Times earlier this week, seminal commentator 
Fintan O’Toole believes that Theresa May’s situation has resonance 
with Roman Emperor Caligula. Though Caligula tends to be 
remembered for his brutality and tyranny as well as his sadism, 
perversion and lavish spending, he possessed sufficient acumen to 
know when some fights were not worth the effort. As O’Toole 
describes, one such example was recorded by the historian 
Suetonius. He wrote that in 40AD Caligula assembled armies and 
supplies “on an unprecedented scale” and marched towards the 
French coast with, it was assumed, the intention to cross the English 
Channel to what was then Britannia. 
Strangely, as Suetonius relates, despite being prepared for the 
crossing, Caligula suddenly announced that his troops should gather 
seashells and the putative invasion was forgotten. Instead he 
instructed that Rome should “prepare a triumph more lavish than any 
hitherto known”. As O’Toole believes, though this was taken as 
evidence that Caligula was becoming increasingly mad, “the world 
would be a better place if all glory-hunting megalomaniacs instructed 
their soldiers, instead of carrying out futile massacres, to collect shells 
on the beach.” 
Indeed, as O’Toole continues, since last December it has been 
obvious that the eventual outcome of the negotiations concerning 
Brexit would be the one that seems to have emerged; “what May 
signed up to – and so did her government, including Boris Johnson 
and David Davis” What this amounts to he believes, “is a miserably 
anti-climactic ending to what was supposed to be an epic of national 
liberation: the UK will remain tied to the EU for a “temporary” period 
that will end on the Twelfth of Never.” 
As O’Toole contends, what May needs to do is to “take the Caligula 
option” in which she gathers “whatever seashells can be rescued from 
the debacle, claim them as tribute from Michel Barnier, award all the 
leading Brexiteers victory crowns, and declare a triumph more lavish 
than any hitherto known.” For good measure he suggests that if she 
plays it well it can be a “Dunkirk moment” in which she is able to claim 
a glorious victory from what is effectively a retreat. 
For those of us who are fascinated by the politics that have 
accompanied the process of Brexit, this is certainly a defining 
moment. If May fails the consequences of a no-deal are unimaginably 
bad, regardless of what advocates of a hard Brexit suggest is 
possible. The compromise deal that has emerged is one that at least 
inflicts minimal damage on the UK economy. For all of our sakes, and 
the prosperity of future generations, we must hope that she succeeds. 
However, whatever deal (or not) that does emerge, it’s highly likely 
that she will succumb to an eventual fate at the hand of enemies 
within her own party that is allegorically, if not literally, similar to 
Caligula’s end. 
 
